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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in 
liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more 
efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast 
reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a 
crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design 
limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis 
transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from 
several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The 
broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an 
enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing 
code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to 
monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the 
complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. 
In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing 
code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish 
this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, 
that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating 
the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP 
framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to 
advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will target 
leadership-class computing architectures for massively-parallel high-fidelity computations while 
providing continued support for rapid prototyping using modest fidelity computations on multiple-core 
desktop platforms. 
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REACTOR CAMPAIGN 
SPECIFICATION OF ADVANCED SAFETY MODELING 
REQUIREMENTS (REV. 0) 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) has lead to renewed 
interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making 
more efficient use of future repository capacity. Liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors in the form of sodium-
cooled fast reactors have been successfully built and tested in the U.S. and throughout the world.[1] 
However, no fast reactor has operated in the U.S. for nearly fourteen years. More importantly, the U.S. 
has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. In addition to reestablishing the 
necessary industrial infrastructure, the development, testing, and licensing of a new, advanced fast reactor 
concept will likely require a significant base technology program that relies more heavily on modeling 
and simulation than has been done in the past. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety 
simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will 
satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and 
beyond design basis transient conditions over the life cycle of a plant. This paper defines the initial 
modeling requirements for an advanced safety modeling capability that fills this role along with a 
transition plan for preserving the enormous institutional knowledge represented in the current, state-of-
the-art, liquid-metal fast reactor safety analysis codes. 
In the sections that follow, a brief overview of a few of the past and existing safety analysis codes is 
presented along with a discussion of some of their limitations from the perspective of developing a 
significantly more advanced capability. Following this background, a selection of safety modeling 
requirements is presented that will form the basis of an advanced safety modeling capability. Because 
currently-available safety analysis codes will play an important role in the near term as higher-resolution 
advanced safety simulation methods are introduced, an implementation strategy is recommended that will 
provide a transition from existing capabilities to the high-fidelity, whole-plant simulation capabilities to 
be developed. 
2. Background 
In the late 1960s, the then U.S. Atomic Energy Commission gave development of a liquid-metal-cooled 
fast reactor (LMR) a high priority, and the development of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) became a 
cornerstone of that program. To provide adequate support for the FFTF and for the expected LMRs to 
follow, a major base technology program was established which provided a continuous stream of 
experimental information and design correlations. This experimental data would either confirm design 
choices or prove the need for design modifications. At the time, the “tremendous amount of data and 
experience pertaining to thermal design” of LMRs was recognized as providing the technical foundation 
for the future commercial development of LMRs.[2] 
Along with the generation of experimental data came the development of safety analysis methods that 
used that data in correlations for mechanistic, probabilistic, or phenomenological models. These models 
were developed for a variety of needs ranging from individual components, such as heat exchangers, 
pumps, or containment barriers, to whole core or even whole-plant dynamics. Because a major portion of 
the overall technical effort expended within the nuclear power industry has always been allocated to 
safety considerations, the breadth of activities carried out since the late 1960s goes well beyond the scope 
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of this paper. Instead, only a few of the more prominent whole-core or whole-plant dynamics safety 
modeling capabilities will be summarized. 
Perhaps the strongest factor that influenced early fast reactor safety analysis was the concern over the 
possibility of core compaction followed by an energetic core disassembly — the so-called Bethe-Tait 
accident.[3] In the late 1960s, the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL) began 
developing the MELT code[4,5] to evaluate the initiating phase of hypothetical core disruption accidents 
(HCDA) as part of the FFTF project. The MELT series of codes has the capability to model the transient 
behavior of several representative fuel pins (channels) within a reactor core to allow for incoherency in 
the accident sequence. By 1978 MELT had evolved into the MELT-IIIB code.[5] 
Around the same time that development on MELT began, Argonne National Laboratory began 
developing the SAS series of codes.[6–10] Like MELT, SAS has the capability to model the transient 
behavior of several representative channels to evaluate the initiating phase of HCDAs. SAS originated 
from a sodium boiling model and includes single- and two-phase coolant flow dynamics, fuel and 
cladding thermal expansion and deformation, molten fuel dynamics, and a point kinetics model with 
reactivity feedback. By 1974, SAS evolved to the SAS2A computer code[7] which included a detailed 
multiple slug and bubble coolant boiling model which greatly enhanced the ability to simulate the 
initiating phases of loss-of-flow (LOF) and transient overpower (TOP) accidents up to the point of 
cladding failure and fuel and cladding melting. 
The SAS3A code[8] added mechanistic models of fuel and cladding melting and relocation. This version 
of the code was used extensively for analysis of accidents in the licensing of FFTF. In anticipation of 
LOF and TOP analysis requirements for licensing of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP), 
new fuel element deformation, disruption, and material relocation models were written for the SAS4A 
version of the code,[9] which saw extensive validation against TREAT M-Series test data. In addition, a 
variant of SAS4A, named SASSYS-1, was developed with the capability to model ex-reactor coolant 
systems to permit the analysis of accident sequences involving or initiated by loss of heat removal or 
other coolant system events. This allows the simulation of whole-plant dynamics feedback for both 
shutdown and off-normal conditions, which have been validated against EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal 
Test (SHRT) data and data from the FFTF LOF tests. Version 2.1 of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 code was 
distributed to Germany, France, and Japan in the late 1980s, and served as the starting point for 
international oxide fuel model developments. 
For HCDAs, SAS and MELT are limited to modeling the initiating phase of the accident sequences up to 
and including non-energetic failures. Argonne also developed the VENUS code to evaluate the energy 
released during an energetic disassembly phase.[11,12] In the disassembly phase the core materials are 
treated as a homogeneous, isotropic fluid, which may not be valid during milder excursions where 
structural considerations become important. To partially address this, the VENUS-II code[12] had the 
option to use pressure thresholds to constrain motion and simulate structural influence. Nevertheless, the 
importance of certain effects (e.g. retained fission gas expansion and coolant vaporization) results in 
significant conservatisms in evaluating accident energetics. 
During accident sequences for which there are insufficient intrinsic negative feedbacks to terminate the 
hypothetical excursion, it is possible that large segments of the core could melt. Because of the 
conservatisms required in evaluating the disassembly phase, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed 
the somewhat higher-fidelity SIMMER code[13,14] that could evaluate the slowly-developing transition 
phase of disrupted core geometry leading up to core disassembly. 
Beyond these early developments, revisions to SAS4A/SASSYS-1 continued into the Integral Fast 
Reactor (IFR) program at Argonne, causing a shift in modeling emphasis towards metallic fuel and 
accident prevention by means of inherent safety mechanisms. The whole-plant dynamics capability of the 
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SASSYS-1 component plays a vital role in predicting passive safety feedback. With the termination of the 
IFR program in 1994, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 saw continued developments with additions for heavy liquid 
metal coolants (lead and lead-bismuth eutectic), steam generator modeling updates and support for spatial 
kinetics. The most recent updates include capabilities for whole-core subchannel analysis.[10] 
In 2002, under the plutonium disposition program, a version of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 was exported to 
Russia and training was provided in its use. Under the GNEP program in the U.S., SAS4A/SASSYS-1 
continues to be a means for evaluating the safety performance of advanced nuclear reactor design features 
and serves as a focal element in international collaboration in fast reactor safety analysis. As an example 
of this latter role, France is currently restoring its version of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 to re-establish a fast 
reactor safety studies capability.  
3. Current Modeling Capabilities and Limitations 
The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 code continues to be maintained under active development and represents the 
current state-of-the-art in fast reactor safety analysis codes. SAS4A/SASSYS-1 contains extensive 
modeling capabilities that represent several hundred person-years of code development effort supported 
by experimental validation. These capabilities include 
• Multiple channel and subchannel modeling of core thermal hydraulics limited only by available 
computing memory. 
• Point kinetics and spatial kinetics capabilities including decay heat and reactivity feedback models for 
fuel Doppler; fuel, cladding, and coolant density variations; coolant voiding; core radial expansion; 
control-rod driveline expansion; and primary vessel expansion. 
• Detailed mechanistic models for oxide fuel and cladding that characterize porosity migration, grain 
growth, fission gas release, fuel cracking with crack healing, fission-gas-induced swelling, 
irradiation-induced steel swelling, gas plenum pressurization, fuel-cladding gap conductance changes, 
fuel and cladding mechanical behavior, thermal expansion, and cladding failure. 
• Detailed models of metallic fuel cladding transient behavior, metal fuel pre-transient thermophysical 
properties characterization, and pre-failure transient behavior models for fuel element mechanics, 
central cavity formation, extrusion, fission-gas-induced swelling, plastic flow, fuel-cladding eutectic 
formation, and fuel element failure detection. 
• Two-phase coolant thermal hydraulics model to characterize low-pressure sodium boiling with the 
ability to track the formation and collapse of multiple bubbles and the ejection of liquid slugs from 
coolant channels. 
• Intra-pin oxide fuel melting and relocation; cladding failure; molten cladding dynamics including 
melting, relocation, and freezing; fuel-coolant interactions in flooded channels including fission gas 
release, cladding perforation, molten fuel flow, and fuel freezing and plating; and fuel, fission gas, 
cladding, and coolant vapor dynamics in voided coolant channels. 
• Primary and intermediate loop reactor coolant systems models for compressible volumes (with or 
without cover gas), pipes, intermediate heat exchangers, centrifugal pumps, electromagnetic pumps, 
valves, bypass channels, annular flow elements, reactor vessel auxiliary cooling systems (RVACS), 
air-dump heat exchangers, and steam generators. 
• Balance of plant thermal hydraulics modeling capabilities including component models for 
deaerators, steam drums, condensers, reheaters, turbines, and several other components. 
• Reactor control system models that are driven by user-defined mathematical operators controlled by 
simulation variables. 
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Because most of these modeling capabilities originated on very early computing architectures, the current 
code demonstrates fast execution times on common desktop computing resources available today. 
However, this origin has also resulted in significant limitations on continued code development. In the 
current code, fast execution times are due in part to the use of coarse-mesh, one-dimensional or even 
quasi one-dimensional models for components and systems. These lower-fidelity models perform very 
well in capturing overall plant dynamic responses to various transient conditions, but they do not capture 
the detailed flow and temperature distributions that evolve within and between components in response to 
transient conditions. It is therefore a priority to implement higher-fidelity models that can be coupled into 
a whole-plant dynamics simulation capability. 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1, like many codes that originated predominantly in the 1970s, represents a monolithic 
application with an archaic code architecture. This resulted from then-modern programming practices 
which targeted scalar computing resources with limited memory and CPU speed. Each component in the 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1 code relies on an interdependent data model which requires significant knowledge of 
the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In addition, the lack of 
modularity impedes the ability to develop higher-fidelity, multi-dimensional component models that can 
take advantage of leadership-class computing resources. This is made more difficult by the fact that 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1 has been under continuous development for approximately 40 years, with significant 
attrition of code development knowledge during its more recent history. 
4. Advanced Safety Modeling Requirements 
In order to develop an advanced safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code 
architecture must be overcome. Nevertheless, a fundamental requirement is to preserve the existing 
capabilities while translating the knowledge of fast reactor physics, fluid dynamics, structural mechanics, 
and fuel performance phenomena that is embedded in the current tools into a more accessible code 
structure. A second fundamental requirement is for the safety modeling capability to be developed under 
an appropriate quality assurance plan as defined by the GNEP program. 
Additional requirements for an advanced safety modeling capability include 
• Modularity 
- Develop component models using modern, modular programming practices to support updating, 
modifying, or replacing component models with little to no modifications to the underlying 
simulation framework. 
- Define functional interfaces for each component model, specifying required input and output 
generated by the component. Where appropriate, define or use data abstractions and models for 
data that is common to several components. Well-defined interfaces and data models facilitate 
connecting components together for multi-physics, system, or mixed-fidelity models. 
- Support regression testing to verify or validate individual component models through the use of 
standalone drivers. 
• Fidelity 
- Target both leadership-class computing (and foreseeable architectures) for massively-parallel 
high-fidelity computations along with continued support for modest-fidelity computations on 
multiple-core desktop computing platforms.  
- Support simultaneous coupling of high-fidelity component models running on many processors 
with low-fidelity or lumped parameter component models running on a single processor. 
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• Framework 
- Support definition of part or all of physical domain using modern CAD or mesh functionality, and 
reading of the physical domain definition from the simulation framework. 
- Communicate with other components through the simulation framework, using geometry or mesh 
for the physical domain definition, and variables on the geometry or mesh for physics quantities. 
- Support coupling at a variety of granularities, from coarse-grained coupling (communication only 
at start or end of run) to fine-grained coupling (communication every time step). 
- Support deformation of physical domain as a result of structural mechanical modeling to provide 
feedback to other components. 
• Overall Integration 
- Support a wide range of transient conditions, from short term “prompt” transients to long-term 
operational transients or transients involving decay-heat removal. 
- Support an efficient steady-state initialization before the onset of the transient calculation to 
minimize the expense of null-transient calculations. 
- Support the coordination of time-step sizes at the coupling interfaces, but component models may 
select smaller steps for internal calculations. 
The above requirements specify a modular based code structure supported by a flexible simulation 
framework. By eliminating unnecessary dependencies like those that exist in current codes, safety 
modeling capabilities can expand far beyond their current limitations to support higher-fidelity 
simulations that are applicable to a wider variety of applications. 
5. Implementation Strategy 
As previously stated, the effort to develop an advanced safety modeling capability must be carried out in a 
way that preserves the existing capabilities while satisfying the requirements defined in the previous 
section. The modular approach based on a flexible framework will allow new capabilities to take 
advantage of modern and future computing architectures while being easier to maintain. This approach is 
consistent with the overall SHARP reactor simulation project at Argonne. 
In the following subsections, the SHARP framework design will be described, and the plans for 
incorporating safety modeling capabilities into the SHARP framework will be given. For a more detailed 
description of the framework and its support of reactor simulation, see Reference 15. 
5.1 SHARP Framework Design 
Physical processes in a nuclear reactor are inherently coupled, depending on reactor physics, thermal-
hydraulics, and structural mechanics. Simulations can vary from detailed, first-principles studies of 
channel flow, done on the largest supercomputers available, to parametric design studies performed on 
workstations in minutes. Results from the detailed calculations are often used to construct models for the 
less detailed codes. Ideally, a modeling framework must support the various simulation types as well as 
the exchange of data and models between them. 
There are several process-based requirements which guide the design of the SHARP framework and 
which are relevant to advanced safety modeling (and which are represented in the requirements in the 
previous section): 
• Minimally intrusive: A variety of codes and code modules have already been developed for use in 
reactor simulations, each with tens or even several hundreds of person-years invested in their 
development, qualification, and validation. It is infeasible to expect that these applications be entirely 
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re-written to fit into a new code coupling framework. Therefore, the effort required to attach a new 
code or physics module to the framework must be minimally intrusive to the original code. 
• Compatibility with standalone development: There are many simulation methods which, while not 
developed originally for that purpose, are well suited to reactor simulation. Furthermore, these codes 
will continue to be developed outside the framework used for reactor simulation. The coupling 
framework must be compatible with standalone development of physics modules, so that updates to 
these modules can be made available as they are developed outside the framework. This capability 
also supports validation and regression testing on individual components independent of the coupled 
code. 
• Utility services: There are many services which are needed by most parallel simulation codes, 
including parallel I/O, mesh generation, and visualization. Advanced techniques like adaptive mesh 
refinement and dynamic load balancing are also of interest to some codes. The coupling framework 
must provide utility services like these to avoid duplicate implementations in individual physics 
modules. The framework must also include a mechanism to add other services as they become 
available. 
• Integrated multi-physics: Finally, there is a need to integrate physics modules of various types to 
perform coupled simulation for some problems. The coupling framework should simplify the addition 
of physics modules and their coupling to other modules in the framework. 
The SHARP framework has been designed to meet these requirements while also providing important 
new simulation capabilities early in the design cycle. Thermal-hydraulic and neutronics modules are 
currently being interfaced to this framework. Section 5.2 describes the initial plans for how safety 
modeling capabilities will be integrated into this framework. 
5.1.1 The ITAPS Mesh and Geometry Interfaces and Supporting Tools 
The SHARP framework is being designed around function interfaces developed as part of ITAPS, a 
project supported by the DOE Scientific Discovery for Advanced Computing (SciDAC) program. The 
primary objective of the ITAPS center is to simplify the use of multiple mesh and discretization strategies 
within a single simulation on petascale computers. This is accomplished through the development of 
common functional interfaces to geometry, mesh, and other simulation data. These interfaces are referred 
to as the iMesh, iGeom, and iField interfaces, respectively. 
The iMesh interface is implemented in the MOAB library. MOAB provides memory- and CPU-time-
efficient storage and access to mesh data using array-based storage. MOAB also provides element types 
encountered in most finite element codes, as well as polygons and polyhedra. Tools included with MOAB 
provide parallel partitioning, parallel I/O, and commonly used functions like finding the outer skin of a 
contiguous mesh. Since the bulk of data in a PDE-based simulation is either the mesh or data associated 
with the mesh, the memory and cpu time performance of this component is critical to the overall 
performance of the coupled simulation. 
The data model used by the mesh interface defines the data types used to pass information through the 
interface and how those types are used to express various mesh-based simulation data. The ITAPS and 
MOAB data models are the same and provide four fundamental data types: 
• Entity: A typical finite element topological entity such as vertex, edge, triangle, or hexahedron. 
• Entity Set: An arbitrary collection of entities and other entity sets. Entity sets also support 
parent/child relationships between sets, which are distinct from a set containing another set. 
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• Interface: An instance of the data model object through which all interface functions are called and 
within which entity handles are unique (i.e. if two entities have the same handle they are the same 
entity). 
• Tag: Application-defined data which can be assigned to any of the other three types. Tags have 
specified size and name, and can have either a specified data type (within integer, double or entity 
handle) or an unspecified (“opaque”) type. 
Although relatively simple, this data model is capable of representing most types of data encountered in 
typical PDE-based simulation codes. For example, material types, processor partitions, and geometric 
topology used to generate a mesh can all be represented using a combination of sets and tags. This data 
model is also being used by the SHARP framework to define boundary conditions and subsets of a mesh 
to be coupled to subsets in another mesh for multi-physics simulations. 
Using a relatively simple but common data model allows the construction of related tools based on 
generic geometric constructs without the need for unique data processing or modifications to dependent 
codes. Several tools are being or have been developed based on this data model that will be crucial to 
high-performance reactor simulation. These tools include: 
• Zoltan: a static partitioning and dynamic load balancing tool from Sandia National Laboratories. 
Zoltan has been modified to interact with a mesh read through iMesh and embed partition data as sets 
and/or tags in iMesh. Other partitioners like Metis and Jostle can also be called through Zoltan.  
• VisIt: a visualization tool developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. VisIt has been 
modified to read mesh data through iMesh, and is being enhanced to allow visualization of and 
interaction with set and tag data. 
• CUBIT/MOAB: In addition to its role as the data conduit for SHARP simulation, MOAB is also able 
to read mesh data written by the CUBIT mesh generation toolkit developed at Sandia National 
Laboratories. If mesh is saved in CUBIT's “.cub” file format, most data (including geometric 
topology) can be restored when read into MOAB. 
• Data Interpolation: Interpolation of data from one mesh to another is being implemented on top of 
MOAB. Various interpolation algorithms will be implemented, starting with a first-order point-in-
element-based algorithm. 
The iGeom interface is implemented in the Common Geometry Module (CGM) component. This 
component allows creation and evaluation of solid model-based geometry. The CUBIT mesh generation 
toolkit uses CGM, and meshes read into MOAB can be re-associated to CGM geometry. This capability 
is useful for adaptive mesh refinement on curved surfaces. Currently, CGM depends on the commercial 
ACIS solid modeling engine. However, development of an engine based on the open source Open 
Cascade modeling engine is underway, and should be ready before the end of FY08. 
5.1.2 SHARP Framework Applications 
As stated earlier, the SHARP framework is designed to simplify the construction of multi-physics 
applications. A variety of application types are supported, as shown in Figure 1. In all cases, code 
developers must separate physical models into a driver and a code library. Most of the physics modeling 
capabilities are put into the library, and therefore are available to both stand-alone and coupled codes. 
This separation is easily accomplished for most modern applications. After this is accomplished, 
developers can connect the physics models (through the library) into the framework in one of several 
ways, depending on the degree of reliance on the framework that is desired. This is illustrated by the 
following. 
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Physics Model A: Stand-Alone Model with Mesh Adapter. Existing massively parallel physics codes 
already implement mesh handling and other capabilities needed for high parallel performance. In these 
codes it may be difficult to replace the mesh implementation with that of the framework, since 
performance is very sensitive to the mesh implementation. In cases like this, writing a mesh adapter is 
most appropriate. The adapter works in both directions, reading the mesh from the framework into the 
native representation of the physics model and writing physics quantities to be coupled to other modules 
from the physics module back into the framework. Adapters like this can be included or not based on 
compile-time directives, and therefore are only used when the module is built in coupled mode. While 
there is some duplication of data and some extra work to copy the data back and forth, this work is not 
substantial, and much of it occurs during startup and is amortized over the entire execution. This approach 
is being used by SHARP with the Nek Thermal/Hydraulics module. At the other end of the spectrum, 
existing code tools such as SAS4A/SASSYS-1 may employ coding practices or solution methods that are 
incompatible with the framework. In this case, the mesh adapter may work across a surface, rather than a 
volume, and the physics model essentially becomes a black box on the other side of the surface. 
Phyiscs Models B and C: Stand-Alone Models without Mesh Adapter. Developers may commit to 
using the framework directly for mesh and field data storage. This allows developers to also take 
advantage of the mesh services shown in Figure 1, including parallel I/O and mesh partitioning. If the 
physics module is written in C or Fortran, it will access the mesh through the iMesh interface. However, 
if the module is written in C++ and is particularly sensitive to memory performance, the data can be 
accessed directly in underlying MOAB implementation. Since the iMesh interface carries little state, the 
module will see the same exact mesh and data through both interfaces. This approach of using the iMesh 
interface is implemented by the UNIC neutronics code in SHARP. 
Physics Models A-C: Multi-Physics Driver. Physics modules are coupled together through the mesh 
and field data stored in the framework. Since these modules are already connected with the framework in 
some way, no extra development work is needed to move data between the module and the framework. 
Data is communicated between physics modules by mapping from the mesh used by one module to the 
mesh used by the other, or directly if modules use the same mesh. Mapping is accomplished using a data 
coupler module, which is implemented as a mesh service on top of the framework. This approach 
centralizes the development of various mapping algorithms and allows mapping to be used by a variety of 
modules. 
Mesh Services
Parallel I/O
Mesh Partitioning
Mesh Refinement
Stand-Alone 
Driver
Stand-Alone 
Driver
Physics
Model B
Stand-Alone 
Driver
Physics
Model A
Mesh 
Adaptor
Stand-Alone 
Driver
Physics
Model B
Stand-Alone 
Driver
Physics
Model A
Mesh 
Adaptor
Coupled Multi-Physics Driver
iMesh
MOAB
Physics
Model C
 
Figure 1: Relationships between Physics Modules and the SHARP Framework. 
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5.2 Safety Modeling in the SHARP Framework 
To the extent possible, it is desirable to preserve and maintain the capabilities of existing codes such as 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1 as high-fidelity whole plant dynamics safety simulation methods are developed. This 
will ensure that a safety simulation capability is available for both short-term and long-term needs. In 
terms of the standalone codes depicted in Figure 1, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is analogous to “Physics Model 
A”. However, the various capabilities and models that are part of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 share a strongly 
interdependent data model that results in a monolithic code that can not be easily separated into modular 
components. This is depicted in Figure 2, where the main components of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 are 
collected into a single box. 
One of the goals of advanced safety simulations is to provide simulation capabilities that do not currently 
exist for fast reactor analyses. It is not sufficient to simply rewrite existing capabilities using modern code 
practices. For example, with the forthcoming international benchmark to evaluate flow patterns and 
thermal stratification in the Monju upper plenum during shutdown conditions, a high-fidelity plenum 
modeling capability will be used. While various capabilities exist in the form of standalone computational 
fluid dynamics codes, none are currently coupled to a whole plant dynamics simulation capability. 
Another example is the need to develop, test, and validate a high-fidelity modeling capability to support 
design and safety evaluations for decay heat removal systems or other safety components. If that 
capability utilizes the SHARP framework, it now becomes a candidate for inclusion in the whole-plant 
dynamics simulation capability. These two standalone capabilities are also shown in Figure 2. Using these 
standalone capabilities as examples, an approach for incorporating them into a whole plant dynamics 
model while maintaining existing capabilities can be described. 
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Figure 2: SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a Monolithic Code Compared to Modular, High-Fidelity Modeling 
Capability Developed within the Framework. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between SAS4A/SASSYS-1 and Advanced Modeling Capabilities when Coupled 
through iMesh. 
Because of increased attention to passive safety and inherent feedback mechanisms in current advanced 
LMR designs, the first phase of development will focus on single-phase dynamic modeling of intact 
geometry and the important role that reactor coolant systems play in the overall passive response. Within 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1, the PRIMAR-4 primary and intermediate loop reactor coolant systems model has 
been identified as a potential point of interface into the SHARP framework. As a result, PRIMAR-4 
becomes the “mesh adapter” identified in Figure 1 while the remainder of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 provides 
the initial whole-plant modeling capability. This relationship is shown in Figure 3. 
PRIMAR-4 contains low-fidelity component models for compressible volumes (with or without cover 
gas) and elements such as pipes, intermediate heat exchangers, centrifugal pumps, electromagnetic 
pumps, valves, bypass channels, annular flow elements, reactor vessel auxiliary cooling systems 
(RVACS), air-dump heat exchangers, and steam generators. For coupling with the reactor core, 
PRIMAR-4 utilizes an extrapolated boundary condition, or estimate, of the thermal-hydraulic conditions 
at the core inlet and outlet. A similar type of approach can be used to couple PRIMAR-4 with the SHARP 
framework. In effect, the framework becomes a new element of PRIMAR-4. However, rather than a 
shared data model, the approach will require a functional interface between the framework and 
PRIMAR-4. 
For subsequent phases of development, new modeling capabilities will be added to the framework in the 
form of modular components. The choice of components will depend on availability of models that have 
been developed for the SHARP framework and need. Over time, as new models are coupled into the 
safety simulation framework, the existing capabilities of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 will gradually become less 
important over time. However, the modeling capabilities of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 can continue to be 
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maintained as a low-fidelity option. For example, the component models in PRIMAR-4 may compose a 
module for low-fidelity modeling of the associated reactor components, or they may be separated into 
individual physics modules for more flexibility. In this way, a smooth transition to an advanced, whole-
plant dynamics simulation capability is provided while preserving and maintaining the capabilities that 
currently exist. 
6. Summary 
Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-
years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of 
mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of 
institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for 
safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic 
applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of 
the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. 
In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing 
code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. A set of advanced 
safety modeling requirements has been defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on 
modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing 
capabilities in the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into this framework is also 
provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced 
modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will target both leadership-
class computing architectures while providing continued support for modest fidelity computations on 
multiple-core desktop platforms. 
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